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ABSTRACT: Stalnaker argued that conditional excluded middle should be included in 
the principles that govern counterfactuals on the basis that intuitions support that 
principle. This is because there are pairs of competing counterfactuals that appear to be 
equally acceptable. In doing so, he was forced to introduced semantic vagueness into his 
system of counterfactuals. In this paper it is argued that there is a simpler and purely 
epistemic explanation of these cases that avoids the need for introducing semantic 
vagueness into the semantics for counterfactuals.  
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1. Introduction 
At least since Quine introduced the Bizet/Verdi case in 1950 there has been 
considerable controversy not only about the possibility of there being any 
adequate analysis of the logic of counterfactual conditionals, but also more 
specifically about the acceptability of the principle known as conditional excluded 
middle (CEM).1 Conditional excluded middle is typically stated as follows: 
(CEM) (A > C)  (A > C). 
CEM is a consequence of what Bonevac calls Stalnaker's rule:2 
(SR) (A > C) 
 A > C 
This issue about CEM was a particular bone of contention between 
Stalnaker and Lewis as they developed their respective accounts of the logic and 
semantics of counterfactuals in the late 60s and 70s. Stalnaker ultimately argued 
that the principle was one that we should incorporate into the logic of 
counterfactuals (he favored the conditional logic C2) and that, as a result of doing 
                                                                
1 W. V. O. Quine, Methods of Logic (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1950).  
2 Daniel Bonevac, Deduction, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). 
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so we must introduce vagueness into the semantics for such conditionals.3 In point 
of fact, he advocated doing this specifically by the use of the theory of 
supervaluations developed by Van Fraassen.4 The result then is a semantic theory 
whereby conditionals in Stalnaker’s logic can be true, false or indeterminate.  
The main reasons why he advocated this fairly radical approach to the 
semantics of counterfactuals are twofold. First, it is supposed to explain our 
inability to choose among competing conditionals like those in the Bizet/Verdi 
case a unique one that is most acceptable. Second, it supports Stalnaker’s intuition 
that CEM is a plausible principle of conditional logic. Here it will be argued that 
we can explain our inability to choose a unique most epistemically acceptable 
conditional from among competing conditionals in Bizet/Verdi cases without 
recourse to a semantics that incorporates vagueness and that we ought to resist the 
temptation to introduce vagueness into the semantics of conditionals due to the 
principle of minimal mutilation. This solution will also allow us to avoid having to 
choose whether or not to incorporate CEM in the logic of conditionals on the basis 
of problems with Bizet/Verdi type cases alone and this is a good thing as that 
determination should probably not be entirely militated by conflicting intuitions 
or by appeals to what most speakers would affirm about Bizet/Verdi cases alone. 
2. Quine’s Example and CEM 
Quine famously discussed the following pair of conditionals in his 1950 book: 
(BV1) If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been Italian. 
(BV2) If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Verdi would have been French. 
What this pair of conditionals is ultimately supposed to show is that there can be 
ties in terms of the closeness of counterfactual possible worlds and so Stalnaker’s 
analysis of the logic of counterfactuals is supposed to fail. The basic idea is that 
while there is good reason to suppose that world where Bizet and Verdi are both 
French or are both Italian are more similar to the actual world than worlds where 
they are, for example, Nigerian, Australian or Sri Lankan it seems intuitively to be 
the case that there is no good reason to suppose either that the world where they 
are both Italian is closer to the actual world than the world where they are both 
French or that the world where they are both French is closer to the actual world 
than the world where they are both Italian. These two counterfactual worlds seem 
                                                                
3 Robert C. Stalnaker, “A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle,” in Ifs, eds. William Harper, 
Robert C. Stalnaker, and Glenn Pearce (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981), 87-104. 
4 Bas C. Van Fraassen, “Singular Terms, Truth-value Gaps and Free Logic,” Journal of Philosophy 
63 (1966): 481-495. 
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to be equally close to the actual world. As a result, there does not seem to be any 
reason to treat one conditional as more acceptable than the other. So, more 
controversially, there is supposed to be no reason to suppose that the first 
conditional is to be regarded as true and the second as false or vice versa. 
However, let us look more closely both at how this problem arises and why 
Stalnaker responds to the Bizet/Verdi case in the way that he does. 
3. Stalnaker’s and Lewis’ Theories in a Nutshell 
Stalnaker and Lewis independently proposed accounts of the logic of 
counterfactuals in the late 60s and early 70s. While these two theories are 
formally quite similar, they were presented on the basis of somewhat different 
semantic ideas. Nevertheless, these semantics differences are largely superficial 
when closely analyzed, with the exception of one major point of disagreement 
that in turn reflects a major difference in terms of the formal principles 
characterizing these two logics. Let us begin by looking at the semantics for these 
two accounts of counterfactuals.  
Stalnaker’s semantics for counterfactuals was presented in terms of possible 
worlds and the concept of a selection function.5 This selection function f takes 
proposition and possible world pairs into a possible world. More straightforwardly 
then, the truth conditions for counterfactuals are given as follows: 
A > B is true at world I, if and only if, B is true at f(A, i). 
Of course, f is governed by a number of well-known constraints. 
Alternatively, Lewis’ semantics for counterfactuals was presented in terms 
of a comparative similarity relation.6 Where S(i, j, k) means that j is more similar 
to i than k is to i, Lewis gives the truth conditions for counterfactuals as follows: 
A > B is true, if and only if, there is a A-world j such that B is true at j and all in 
all A-worlds at least as similar to i as to j. 
Stalnaker, however, showed that the choice of presenting semantics in terms of a 
selection function or in terms of a comparative similarity relation is really 
arbitrary.7 Nevertheless, the two theories of counterfactuals that arise from these 
semantic basis and the constraints imposed on them are not strictly equivalent. It 
turns out that when one looks at the details, Stalnaker’s theory is a special more-
restricted case of Lewis’ theory. Lewis’ theory involves a well-ordering of all 
                                                                
5 Robert C. Stalnaker, “A Theory of Conditionals,” in Studies in Logical Theory, ed. James W. 
Cornman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968), 98-112. 
6 David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973). 
7 Stalnaker, “A Defense of Conditional,” 87-104. 
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possible worlds while Stalnaker’s theory involves only a weak total ordering of 
possible worlds. This then gives rise to the crucial point where the theories differ. 
Stalnaker’s theory assumes what Lewis called the limit and uniqueness 
assumptions. The details of the limit assumption are not important here, but 
acceptance of it and the uniqueness assumption is what gives rise to the problems 
associated with CEM noted above.8 The uniqueness assumption can be stated as 
follows: 
(uniqueness) for every world i and proposition A there is at most one A-world 
minimally different from i. 
Accepting both of these assumptions amounts to the acceptance of CEM, but the 
uniqueness assumption is what effectively rules out ties in the similarity of worlds. 
There cannot be two worlds that are equally similar to a given possible world. 
Stalnaker admits that this is an idealization that he has made with respect to 
the semantics of counterfactuals, specifically with respect to the selection 
function.9 He defends this view on the basis of “…unreflective linguistic 
intuition,”10 and argues essentially that treating both of the Bizet/Verdi 
counterfactuals as indeterminate in truth value better reflects such semantic 
intuitions than Lewis’ view, where they both turn out to be false. 
4. Coherence as a Guide to Counterfactual Acceptance 
Stalnaker and Lewis developed their semantic views of counterfactuals in terms of 
truth conditions and this was framed in terms of possible worlds. However, as 
argued in the previous section, the issue of the acceptability of CEM should not be 
driven by semantic considerations. Rather, what is needed is a clear account of the 
acceptability conditions for counterfactuals that explains the resistance to CEM 
and Bizet/ Verdi type cases. Fortunately, there has been considerable discussion of 
this matter in the debate about the Ramsey test for conditional acceptance that is 
so-named because of Ramsey's brief footnote comment made in a paper in 1929. 
In this vein, Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinso 
developed the AGM theory of belief revision in the 1980s and a number of related 
theories have arisen as a consequence.11 Here we will specifically focus on the 
                                                                
8 See Charles B. Cross, “Conditional Excluded Middle,” Erkenntnis 70 (2009): 173-188 for 
discussion of the relationship between the limit assumption, the uniqueness assumption and the 
principle of counterfactual consistency. 
9 Stalnaker, “A Defense of Conditional,” 89. 
10 Stalnaker, “A Defense of Conditional,” 92. 
11 See Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson, “On the Logic of Theory 
Change: Partial Meet Functions for Contraction and Revision,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 
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version of this view as presented by Gärdenfors.12 These theories are 
fundamentally based on the concept of a belief state, belief set or a corpus of 
beliefs, K, typically satisfying the following minimal conditions (where it is 
assumed that belief states are given a representation in some language L):  
(BS) A set of sentences, K, is a belief state if and only if (i) K is consistent, and (ii) 
K is objectively closed under logical implication. 
The content of a belief state is then defined as the set of logical consequences of K 
(so {b: K  b} =df. Cn(K)). Given this basic form of epistemic representation, the 
AGM-type theories are intended to be a normative theory about how a given 
belief state which satisfies the definition of a belief state is related to other belief 
states satisfying that definition relative to: (1) the addition of a new belief b to Ki, 
or (2) the retraction of a belief b from Ki, where b  Ki. Belief changes of the latter 
kind are termed contractions, but belief changes of the former kind must be 
further sub-divided into those that require giving up some elements of Ki and 
those that do not. Additions of beliefs that do not require giving up previously 
held beliefs are termed expansions, and those that do are termed revisions.13 
Specifically, for our purposes here it is the concept of a revision that is of crucial 
importance to the issue of providing an account of rational commitment for 
conditionals. In any case, given AGM-style theories the dynamics of beliefs will 
then simply be the epistemically normative rules that govern rational cases of 
contraction, revision and expansion of belief states.  
The fundamental insight behind these theories is then that belief changes 
that are contractions should be fundamentally conservative in nature. In other 
words, in belief changes one ought to make the minimal alterations necessary to 
incorporate new information and to maintain or restore logical consistency. This 
fundamental assumption is supposed to be justified in virtue of a principle of 
informational economy. This principle holds that information is intrinsically and 
practically valuable and so we should retain it at all costs unless we are forced to 
do otherwise. So, while the details are not important here, the revision operations 
on belief states are restricted so as to obey a principle of minimal mutilation.  
                                                                                                                                       
(1985): 510-30, Peter Gärdenfors, Knowledge in Flux. Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic 
States (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988) and Isaac Levi, For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey test 
Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
12 In Gärdenfors, Knowledge in Flux. 
13 In point of fact the AGM theory really only holds that there are two dynamical operations on 
belief states, because revision is defined in terms of expansion and contraction. 
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What is important to the topic of this paper is that on the basis of such 
theories of belief revision, the defenders of this approach to belief dynamics have 
also proposed that one could also give a theory of rational conditional 
commitment.14 The core concept of this theory is the Ramsey Test:15 
(RT) Accept a sentence of the form A > C in the state of belief K if and only if the 
minimal change of K needed to accept A also requires accepting C.16  
Even in this quasi-formal form we can see what the AGM and other 
theorists have in mind. The Ramsey Test requires that we modify our beliefs by 
accepting A into our standing system of beliefs and then see what the result is.17 
This view is typically framed in terms of a version of the epistemological 
coherence theory of justification and this seems natural given BS.18 The idea is 
that one's beliefs are justified to the degree that they hang together or are 
mutually supportive. The idea then is that our belief system is justified in virtue of 
this feature of the system as a whole and there are several extant version of 
                                                                
14 See Peter Gärdenfors, “An Epistemic Approach to Conditionals,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 18 (1981): 203-211, Gärdenfors, Knowledge in Flux, and Peter Gärdenfors, “Imaging 
and Conditionalization,” The Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 747-760. 
15 See F. P. Ramsey, “Laws and Causality,” reprinted in F.P. Ramsey: Philosophical Papers, ed. D. 
H. Mellor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929/1990). See Michael Shaffer, “Three 
Problematic Theories of Conditional Acceptance,” Logos & Episteme 1 (2011): 117-125 and 
Michael Shaffer, “Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology and Belief-Contravening 
Commitments,” American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2013): 73-82 for some discussions of 
problems for naïve formulations of the Ramsey test. 
16 For a relatively recent discussion of RT and related views see Isaac Levi, Mild Contraction 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
17 David H. Sanford, If P, then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Routledge, 2003) contains the objection that in many cases where the antecedent of such 
a conditional is a radical departure from what we believe to be the case, we cannot in fact 
employ the Ramsey test because we do not know what would be the case if we believed such an 
antecedent. So, he claims that many conditions are simply void, rather than true or false. It is 
worth pointing out here that Sanford’s criticism is weak at best. It simply does not follow that 
because we cannot always clearly determine what would be the case if we were to believe some 
claim, a conditional with such an antecedent has no truth value. See chapters 5 and 6 of 
Timothy Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy (Blackwell, Oxford, 2007) for discussion of 
one suggestion for how such knowledge might be obtained. 
18 See Peter Gärdenfors, “The Dynamics of Belief Systems: Foundations Versus Coherence 
Theories,” in Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, eds. Cristina Bicchieri, Maria Luisa 
Dalla Chiara (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) for the most thorough defense of 
the AGM theory in terms of coherentism. See Michael Shaffer, “Coherence, Justification, and 
the AGM Theory of Belief Revision,” in Perspectives on Coherentism, ed. Yves Bouchard 
(Ontario: Aylmer-Éditions du Scribe, 2002) for some worries about this view. 
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coherence theory that are plausible views of justification.19 The most famous are of 
course those of BonJour and Lehrer, but Thagard's version is also a well-regarded 
and more recent version of coherentism.20 In any case, we need not get bogged 
down in the debate about the particular details of coherentism here and we can 
simply adopt a basic, largely unanalyzed and broadly intuitive conception of that 
view for the purposes of this paper. This is also desirable because the results here 
are then not dependent on any particular version of coherence theory. So we shall 
simply accept that a belief corpus is coherent to the degree that its elements fit 
together and are mutually supportive. Once we accept this interpretation of RT 
and the notion of a belief state on which it is based, there is a natural way to 
extend RT to cases of comparative acceptance for conditionals. 
First, it is important to note that it is not at all clear that on RT either BV1 
or BV2 is acceptable. This is because the minimal change of belief needed to 
incorporate the claim that Bizet and Verdi are compatriots does not obviously 
require accepting either that Bizet would have been Italian or that Verdi would 
have been French. But, both BV1 and BV2 seem to be acceptable conditionals 
nonetheless because accepting the shared antecedent permits one to accept either 
that Bizet would have been Italian or that Verdi would have been French. What is 
also important in the case of BV1 and BV2 is that they in an important sense 
compete. We then need to introduce the appropriate concept of a competitor as it 
applies to counterfactual conditionals. For the purpose of this paper we can simply 
adopt the following concept of the competition of conditionals: 
(COMP) A counterfactual conditional A>C competes with all other 
counterfactual conditionals that have A as an antecedent. 
So, in the case of the Bizet/Verdi conditionals, we have a case of two 
competing conditionals and this should be no surprise. As we have seen there is 
something important about the relationship between those two conditionals that 
ties them together intimately. Given COMP we can then replace RT with an 
appropriate concept of comparative acceptance given the coherentist 
interpretation of belief states as follows: 
                                                                
19 There is of course some controversy about such views, especially those that are framed in 
terms of probabilistic notions of coherence. See Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann, Bayesian 
Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Erik J. Olsson, Against Coherence, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) for discussion of this matter. 
20 See Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 
and Paul Thagard, Coherence in Thought and Action (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). 
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(CCA) Accept a sentence A > C in the state of belief K rather than A > B if and 
only if the minimal change of K needed to accept A, K', permits accepting C, the 
minimal change of K needed to accept A, K'', also permits accepting B and the 
changes necessary to maintain the coherence of K' are less extensive than those 
necessary to maintain the coherence of K''.  
So defined, the principle of comparative conditional acceptance allows us to 
introduce a differential notion of conditional acceptance that is normative because 
it is based on the coherence theory of justification. Moreover, as we shall see in 
the next section, it allows us to explain Bizet/Verdi cases without having to 
depend entirely on suspicious appeals to semantic intuitions and without having 
to introduce vagueness into the semantics for those conditionals.21 
5. Explaining Bizet/Verdi Cases. 
So why are our two conditionals so problematic and how does CCA make sense of 
the apparently problematic nature of them? Recall the Bizet/Verdi conditionals: 
(BV1) If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been Italian. 
(BV2) If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Verdi would have been French. 
By COMP BV1 and BV2 are competing counterfactual conditionals. Now if we 
apply CCA to our dual of sentences we should see that the revision of our state of 
belief K by the addition of the shared antecedent of BV1 and BV2 permits the 
acceptance both of the claim that (I) Bizet would have been Italian and it also 
permits the acceptance of the claim that (F) Verdi would have been French.22 This 
can be made more apparent by comparing the case of BV1 and BV2 with the cases 
where BV1 and BV2 are compared in terms of CCA with the following 
conditional: 
(BV3) If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have been Dutch.  
The changes necessary to accept BV3 are clearly more extensive than those 
needed to maintain consistency given the acceptance of BV1 or BV2. Moreover, 
given the relevant parts of our belief corpus and our intuitive understanding of 
coherence it also reasonable to suppose that the revision of K by I, K', and the 
revision of K by F, K'', are equally extensive. Both resultant belief states hang 
                                                                
21 The reliability of semantic intuitions has recently been questioned in Edouard Machery. Ron 
Mallon. Shaun Nichols, and Stephen P. Stich, “Semantics, Cross-cultural Style,” Cognition 92 
(2004): B1-B12 and the reliability of intuitions in general have been more generally question in 
Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich, “Normativity and Epistemic 
Intuitions,” Philosophical Topics 29 (2001): 429-460.. 
22This can be seen also in that both BV1and BV2 satisfy RT. 
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together or are mutually supportive to the same degree – or to a very similar 
degree – given what we know about Bizet, Verdi and the world in general, and the 
degree of change necessary to incorporate the antecedent and consequent of both 
is not noticeably different. It is just as coherent and requires the same sorts of 
changes of the same degree to suppose that, if the two men were compatriots, 
Bizet would be French as it is to suppose that, if the two men were compatriots, 
Verdi would be Italian. But the changes necessary to pursue either of these options 
in a coherent manner are clearly less extensive than the changes necessary to 
entertain the supposition that if the two men were compatriots, Bizet (or Verdi) 
would have been Dutch. Importantly, this means that while both BV1 and BV2 
are acceptable there is no reason to accept BV1 over BV2 and no reason to accept 
BV2 over BV1 as per CCA. This then straightforwardly explains our inability to 
determine which is true and it explains this without any appeal to semantic 
vagueness and without any unsupported appeals to semantic intuition. As a result, 
we do not need to take Stalnaker's radical semantic steps in order to deal with 
these sorts of cases. If the theory of counterfactual acceptance presented here is 
even broadly correct, then that the Bizet/Verdi cases are odd may well just be a 
reflection of a purely epistemic phenomenon and nothing deeper. This recognition 
in turn then shows that the Bizet/Verdi type cases do not decide the issue of CEM 
one way or the other. The metaphysical/semantic matter about of whether there 
can be ties in terms of the similarities of worlds is not decided simply because we 
cannot epistemically distinguish conditionals in Bizet/Verdi type cases, and in 
deference to the principle of minimal mutilation we ought to resist the move to 
introduce vagueness into the semantics of conditionals pace Stalnaker. 
